
ARE TRUMP AND RUBIO PLANNING TO “MADURO” CUBA — THROUGH RAÚL CASTRO AND DÍAZ-CANEL?
by Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D. (Anthropology, UCLA), Co-Chair, World Peace Association Research/Contributor: Minerva Monroe

Cuba stands once again at the crossroads of empire, indictment, sanctions, survival, and sovereignty.
Trump and Rubio are reviving a familiar U.S. pattern: take a real Cuban grievance, detach it from the wider history of invasion, blockade, exile operations, and Cold War violence, then use it as moral cover for regime-change pressure.
The question is not only whether they are targeting Miguel Díaz-Canel, Cuba’s current president. The sharper question is whether they are using Raúl Castro’s past, the 1996 Brothers to the Rescue shootdown, and the economic crisis inside Cuba as a combined mechanism to “Maduro” the island — that is, to place the Cuban state under escalating legal, economic, military, and psychological pressure until Washington can justify direct intervention, coercive transition, or forced political surrender.
In May 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a superseding indictment charging Raúl Castro and five co-defendants in connection with the 1996 shootdown of Brothers to the Rescue aircraft. The announcement identified Raúl Castro as Cuba’s defense minister at the time and placed the old tragedy back at the center of U.S.-Cuba confrontation.
The deaths of the four men mattered. No humane account of the event should erase their lives, their families, or the trauma carried by the Cuban exile community. But grief can be honored without allowing grief to become a weapon. The deeper issue is whether a thirty-year-old confrontation is now being reopened not simply for justice, but as part of a wider pressure campaign against Cuba’s current government.

The Brothers to the Rescue tragedy still carries grief, but grief can also be used as a lever for new escalation.
Raúl Castro’s alleged order came in the context of repeated exile flights, Cuban claims of sovereignty violations, and a long record of U.S.-backed hostility toward the island. Whatever one thinks of the shootdown, it involved a specific confrontation over aircraft and contested airspace. It was narrower than the Trump-era lethal boat-strike campaign in Latin American waters, which is now reportedly under Pentagon watchdog review after nearly 200 people were killed in attacks on alleged drug-smuggling boats.
That contrast matters. Washington condemns Havana for lethal force in 1996, yet the current U.S. administration has itself used lethal force across Latin American waters under claims of national-security necessity. This does not excuse Cuba’s conduct. It exposes the moral danger of selective outrage when powerful states condemn violence by others while normalizing their own.
Cuba has lived for centuries at the crossroads of empire, revolt, blockade, and survival.
Indigenous partnership cultures gave way to the Spanish conquest. Cuban independence fighters defeated Spain, only to see Washington impose a new sphere of control. The Spanish-American War ended Spanish rule, but the Platt Amendment helped convert Cuban independence into a conditional sovereignty watched, shaped, and periodically interrupted by the United States.
Batista’s U.S.-backed order collapsed in 1959, but the revolution that promised dignity also hardened into a one-party security state. Fidel Castro became the face of defiance. Raúl Castro became the military organizer, state manager, and institutional survivor. Díaz-Canel inherited the visible command of a system burdened by sanctions, shortages, bureaucracy, emigration, blackout crises, public discontent, and the unresolved legacy of the revolution itself.
Now, Trump and Rubio return Cuba to the old imperial script: isolate, accuse, threaten, sanction, and present regime change as rescue.

Raúl Castro, now in his nineties, is no longer Cuba’s president, but many observers still view him as a powerful elder symbol behind the system. Díaz-Canel governs the visible state: shortages, blackouts, emigration, protest, repression, partial reforms, and survival under sanctions. His policies largely continue Raúl’s cautious economic adjustments without surrendering one-party control.
This is why the title question needs both names. If Washington targets Raúl Castro legally, it targets the revolutionary past. If it targets Díaz-Canel politically, it targets the present government.
If it targets GAESA, Cuba’s military-linked business conglomerate, it targets the economic machinery of the Cuban state. GAESA has moved to the center of U.S.-Cuba tensions. Reuters describes GAESA as a powerful Cuban military-run conglomerate that controls hotels, ports, banks, supermarkets, remittance businesses, and other key sectors. U.S. officials accuse it of hoarding wealth for military elites while ordinary Cubans endure shortages and blackouts; Cuba disputes or rejects many U.S. claims, and GAESA’s finances remain opaque. “Cuba is controlled by GAESA,” Rubio said on Wednesday in a video message in Spanish addressed to the Cuban people. A ‘state within the state’ that is accountable to no one and hoards the profits from its businesses for the benefit of a small elite. Cuba is controlled by GAESA,” Rubio said on Wednesday in a video message in Spanish addressed to the Cuban people. A ‘state within the state’ that is accountable to no one and hoards the profits from its businesses for the benefit of a small elite.
Rubio’s hostility is not new. As a Florida hardliner, he has long treated Cuba policy through the lens of anti-Castro exile politics. In May 2026, Rubio announced new sanctions against Cuba’s military-industrial enterprise, its leadership, and related entities, while the State Department framed the measures as a national-security action against Cuba’s military regime and elites.
Trump’s approach fits his larger pattern: undo Obama’s openings, dramatize force, threaten escalation, and call pressure “strength.” Recent reporting describes a broader Trump “maximum pressure” campaign on Cuba, including tightened sanctions and restrictions on oil shipments, framed as a strategy to force major economic and political change on the island.
Díaz-Canel governs the visible crisis: shortages, blackouts, sanctions, protests, repression, and survival.
This is where the word “Maduro” becomes more than a rhetorical flourish. It evokes the U.S. operation against Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and the use of criminal charges, military pressure, sanctions, and regional force projection to redefine a foreign leader not merely as an adversary, but as a target. Recent Associated Press reporting described Trump and Rubio raising the possibility of military intervention in Cuba after the Raúl Castro indictment, while also noting Rubio’s stated preference for a negotiated resolution even as he doubted diplomacy with Cuba’s current government.
That combination — indictment, sanctions, military language, economic pressure, and diplomatic doubt — is dangerous.
A humane Cuba policy would not romanticize the Cuban state. The government has restricted political opposition, controlled public speech, punished dissent, and failed to create a political system in which Cubans can freely choose their leaders, organize parties, criticize officials, and reshape the nation without fear. Cuban suffering is real, and many Cuban families have every reason to criticize Havana.
But a humane policy would also not pretend that Cuba’s crisis exists in a vacuum. Sanctions, embargo restrictions, blocked investment, exile politics, propaganda campaigns, and decades of hostility have shaped the conditions under which Cuban society struggles. Washington cannot help set a house on fire, then claim moral purity when people inside gasp for air.
Obama’s alternative was imperfect but sane: restore diplomatic relations, reopen embassies, expand travel, encourage exchange, and replace permanent siege with engagement. That path should be revived. Lift the blockade. Restore ambassadors. Provide food and fuel assistance. Encourage medical, cultural, educational, agricultural, and scientific exchange. Build friendship between Americans and Cubans rather than another Caribbean war.

Cuba does not need another invasion. It does not need another proxy war. It does not need a new Monroe Doctrine dressed in humanitarian language. It does not need Washington to decide, once again, that the Caribbean is a chessboard and Cuban lives are pieces to move.
Cuba needs light, fuel, medicine, food, sovereignty, political freedom, honest reform, and peace.
The Cuban people deserve relief from internal repression and external siege. They deserve a future that is not dictated by one-party control in Havana or regime-change fantasies in Washington. They deserve the right to breathe, speak, build, dissent, heal, trade, travel, and live without becoming the next theater in an imperial drama.
Stand with the Cuban people.
Stand for diplomacy.
Stand for peace.
Cuba does not need another invasion. It needs light, fuel, medicine, food, sovereignty, and peace.

Díaz-Canel’s Cuba



Stand With the Cuban People
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References
U.S. Department of Justice. “U.S. Unseals Superseding Indictment Charging Raul Castro and Five Castro Regime Co-Defendants for 1996 Shoot-Down of Brothers to the Rescue Aircraft.” May 20, 2026.
Reuters. “What is GAESA, which has taken center stage in US-Cuba tensions?” May 22, 2026.
U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Sanctions Target Cuba’s Military Regime, Elites.” May 2026.
Council on Foreign Relations. “Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign on Cuba, Explained.” March 31, 2026.
Associated Press. “Rubio doubtful of diplomacy with Cuba as Trump raises new threat of military action.” May 22, 2026.
Associated Press / Washington Post. “Pentagon watchdog to evaluate US military’s boat strikes in Latin America.” May 19, 2026. 
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