By Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D. (Anthropology, UCLA)
On October 10, 2026, missiles and drones brought the violence of Yemen’s long war into the Saudi capital, Riyadh.
An attack on King Khalid International Airport killed at least 13 people and injured more than 300.
Travelers, including Muslim pilgrims, were caught in the destruction.
Days later, an attack struck the headquarters of Saudi Aramco, the giant oil company on which much of Saudi Arabia’s wealth depends.
Fires spread through several floors of the building in Dhahran.
The Houthis warned that further attacks on Saudi airports and petroleum installations would follow.
Saudi Arabia’s military responded with strikes against Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
The conflict threatened to expand beyond the Arabian Peninsula.
The United States and Israel had launched a war against Iran in February 2026.
The Houthis, aligned with Iran but possessing their own political and military ambitions, increasingly challenged Saudi Arabia’s ability to defend its territory and export petroleum.
President Donald Trump discussed Saudi requests for military assistance but had not committed American combat aircraft to the new Saudi campaign as of the October 13 PBS report.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman confronted a dilemma: he had promised to transform the Saudi economy through modernization, tourism, and investment.
Now missile attacks, frightened travelers, endangered oil installations, and disrupted air traffic threatened that program.
DOMINATION: Armed elites strike airports, energy facilities, and cities to compel their adversaries to submit.
PARTNERSHIP: Ordinary people need safe transportation, functioning hospitals, reliable employment, and governments that resolve disputes without sacrificing civilians.
HOUTHIS, RELIGION, REBELLION & THE STRUGGLE FOR YEMEN
The Houthi movement, also known as ANSAR ALLAH, emerged in northern Yemen from a Zaidi Shia religious and political revival. Zaidism has a long history in Yemen and differs from the Twelver Shiism dominant in Iran in important respects.
The movement’s early leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, was killed during fighting with Yemen’s government in 2004.
His brother, ABDUL-MALIK AL-HOUTHI, later became the movement’s principal leader.
The Houthis challenged the Yemeni government, denounced foreign influence, and developed an increasingly powerful military organization.
They seized the capital, Sanaa, in 2014 and expanded their control over northern Yemen.
Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in 2015, leading a coalition intended to restore Yemen’s internationally recognized government and prevent an Iranian-aligned movement from consolidating power along its southern border.
The war devastated Yemen. Airstrikes, ground fighting, economic collapse, restrictions on trade, and the breakdown of essential services left millions of people dependent on humanitarian assistance.
A United Nations-brokered truce in 2022 reduced large-scale fighting, but it did not produce a lasting political settlement.
By September 2026, the Houthis had advanced along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and strengthened their position near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Their military capabilities included drones, missiles, and forces hardened by years of conflict.
Abdul-Malik al-Houthi had transformed a regional insurgency into a force capable of threatening Saudi Arabia and international shipping.
Houthi advances brought suffering to civilians and prisoners.
The essential distinction is between Yemen’s people and the organizations claiming authority over them.
Yemenis are not synonymous with the Houthis, the internationally recognized government, tribal authorities, or any foreign patron.
BAB-EL-MANDEB: THE GATE OF TEARS BECAME A WEAPON
The BAB-EL-MANDEB STRAIT separates Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula from Djibouti and Eritrea on the African side of the Red Sea.
Its name is commonly translated as the Gate of Tears.
Ships traveling between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean pass through the Gulf of Aden, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal.
This passage carries petroleum, manufactured goods, grain, and countless other products.
Control of the strait does not require controlling every ship.
A military force with missiles, drones, naval mines, or fast attack boats can threaten commercial vessels and make insurers and shipping companies reconsider using the route.
The Houthis’ 2026 advance along Yemen’s coast increased their ability to threaten maritime commerce and Saudi oil exports.
The strategic danger grew when the Strait of Hormuz, another critical passage for petroleum exports, was effectively closed during the regional war.
Saudi Arabia used its East-West pipeline to move oil to Red Sea ports, but exports traveling south still depended on passage through Bab-el-Mandeb.
Thus, two narrow passages could constrain a substantial share of Middle Eastern petroleum transportation.
A regional conflict could become an international economic crisis.
DOMINATION: Control the chokepoint, threaten shipping, and compel other states to negotiate from weakness.
PARTNERSHIP: Keep commercial waterways open, protect civilian mariners, and allow food, fuel, and medical supplies to reach populations that depend on them.
IRAN, ISRAEL, BRITAIN & THE UNITED STATES: WHO BENEFITS FROM THE WAR?
Iran’s leaders regard the Houthis as an important partner in their regional confrontation with Israel and the United States.
Iran has supported the movement, while the Houthis have developed their own leadership, interests, and capacity to act independently. Treating every Houthi decision as an order from Tehran oversimplifies the relationship.
Former U.S. ambassador Michael Ratney emphasized this distinction in his October 13 PBS interview. He described the Houthis as aligned with Iran but not necessarily controlled by it. He also argued that Saudi Arabia would ultimately need diplomacy because the alternatives risked further economic and human damage.
For Israel, Houthi missiles, drones, and maritime operations pose a security concern, particularly when connected to wider Iranian-aligned military networks. Israeli leaders seek to prevent attacks on Israeli territory and shipping and to weaken Iran’s regional military reach.
For Britain, the Red Sea is a vital international trade route. British interests include freedom of navigation, commercial shipping, relations with Gulf states, and security cooperation with the United States.
For the United States, the dilemma is especially acute.
Washington has long supplied Saudi Arabia with military equipment and security assistance. Yet direct American attacks on the Houthis could open another front in an already expanding regional war.
In October 2026, Saudi leaders sought American airstrikes against Houthi missile and drone capabilities. The Trump administration provided intelligence and targeting support but remained reluctant to carry out the direct strikes Riyadh wanted.
Yet each government’s policies also affect the security and welfare of people who have little control over military decisions.
Domination Devotees argue that rival states use military power, strategic alliances, religious loyalties, and economic pressure to shape the region in their favor; Partnership Partisans argue that international cooperation should prioritize negotiated security arrangements, civilian protection, trade access, and accountability for attacks on noncombatants.
A genuine partnership analysis must also acknowledge that governments sometimes face real security threats. Protecting civilians against missiles is legitimate; it does not justify indiscriminate retaliation or the suppression of political rights.
PAKISTAN & TURKEY: SAUDI ALLIES FACE THE DANGER OF A WIDER WAR
Saudi Arabia’s security concerns now extend beyond its traditional relationship with Washington.
Pakistan and Turkey have moved toward closer defense cooperation with the kingdom.
Both countries have significant military capabilities, longstanding ties with Saudi Arabia, and populations whose economic interests could be affected by regional instability.
TURKEY
In October 2026, Turkish President RECEP TAYYIP ERDOĞAN condemned the Houthi attacks and declared support for Saudi Arabia.
He said Turkey would submit a defense agreement involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to Turkey’s parliament.
On October 15, Turkey clarified that the agreement’s military support would require parliamentary approval and would remain defensive.
But diplomatic solidarity and a defense agreement do not automatically mean participation in an offensive war.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan must also balance several interests: security relations with Saudi Arabia, its own economic vulnerabilities, its relationship with neighboring Iran, and the danger of becoming involved in another country’s war.
SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia may regard these partnerships as a way to reduce dependence on Washington.
Turkey and Pakistan may see them as opportunities to strengthen regional influence and security cooperation.
CIVILIANS SUFFER
A Pakistani laborer may benefit from economic relations with Saudi Arabia but suffer if conflict disrupts employment or raises fuel prices.
A Turkish family may value regional stability without wanting Turkish soldiers sent into another war.
A Saudi household may want its government to defend the country while also demanding that the fighting end.
Ordinary citizens have competing political views, loyalties, and material interests.
They can cooperate, compete, support military action, or oppose it.
People and institutions can cultivate it as a political and social choice.
DOMINATION VERSUS PARTNERSHIP: THE PEOPLE PAY FOR THE RULERS’ WARS
The struggle for Yemen and the Red Sea illustrates a recurring pattern in human history.
Those who command armies, states, religious institutions, and great concentrations of wealth compete for strategic advantage.
They invoke national security, religion, territorial rights, historical grievances, and economic necessity.
But military and political leaders can also use them to justify actions that expose civilians to terrible suffering.
Humanity inherited a domination-oriented pattern from rulers who organized societies through hierarchy, command, warfare, and competition for who gets to command, who must obey, who receives the rewards, and who bears the costs.
Houthi leaders regard control of the Red Sea coast as a source of military strength.
Iran’s rulers may see it as leverage against their adversaries.
Saudi leaders may seek to preserve their kingdom’s security and economic transformation.
American and British officials may emphasize shipping and regional stability.
But Yemeni families face displacement, hunger, damaged infrastructure, and imprisonment or violence by armed groups.
Saudi families face missiles, disrupted flights, and fear for their safety.
A Yemeni child and a Saudi child do not benefit merely because their respective rulers have gained a military advantage.
It would also require confronting abuses by the Houthis, the Saudi-led coalition, Yemeni factions, and other actors rather than treating any side as morally exempt.
The choice is not between Saudi domination and Houthi domination.
Nor is it between Iranian, Israeli, American, or British domination.
The deeper choice is between systems that subordinate people to concentrated power and systems that make political authority answerable to human welfare.
The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait could be a passage for international cooperation rather than a weapon of coercion.
Yemen could become a country where citizens choose their leaders and rebuild their communities.
Saudi Arabia could pursue prosperity without renewed warfare.
Pakistan and Turkey could strengthen regional relations without expanding the conflict.
None of these outcomes is guaranteed. They depend on political decisions, institutions, negotiations, and organized public pressure.
The Gate of Tears need not remain a gate of suffering.
KEYWORDS
Houthis, Ansar Allah, Yemen War, Saudi Arabia, Houthi missile attacks, Riyadh airport attack, King Khalid International Airport, Saudi Aramco, Dhahran, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, Zaidi Shia Islam, Iran, Israel, United States, Britain, Donald Trump, Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi defense alliances, Red Sea conflict, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Gate of Tears, Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, oil shipping routes, global petroleum trade, maritime security, Iranian regional influence, Houthi drones, military escalation, Yemen humanitarian crisis, civilian casualties, regional diplomacy, domination consciousness, partnership consciousness, Anunnaki domination ideology, Zecharia Sitchin, civilian protection, peace negotiations, international cooperation, Yemeni self-determination, Middle East geopolitics, October 2026
HASHTAGS
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Suggested principal hashtags for Facebook and Substack: #Houthis, #YemenWar, #SaudiArabia, #RedSea, #BabElMandeb, #Iran, #MiddleEastConflict, #DominationVsPartnership, #PeaceForYemen, #EnkiSpeaks
