Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph. D.

Iran Timeline, Part 19: 1993–2007 IRAN BACKED HAMAS AS GAZA BROKE FROM THE PALESTINE AUTHORITY

From Oslo to Gaza — Diplomacy Collapses, Networks Advance

By Sasha Alex Lessin, Ph.D. (Anthropology, UCLA)

The Oslo Accords opened a path to peace between Israel and Iran, but Iran chose proxy war instead.  The Accords created a framework for Palestinian self-rule through negotiation with the Palestinian Authority. For a moment, diplomacy appeared to offer a way to peace. But Iran, emerging from the Iran–Iraq War, had already decided to avoid any direct wars and instead built influence through terrorist networks, starting with Hamas.

Hamas was not created by Iran. It arose inside Palestine during the First Intifada. But once the PLO entered negotiations with Israel, Iran increasingly treated Hamas as the more useful force—militant, uncompromising, and positioned outside the Oslo framework. Hamas, though Sunni in origin, became a key partner in Iran’s Shiite-led regional network—not through shared theology, but through shared enemies and converging strategic aims. Over the next fourteen years, that alignment helped transform Gaza from a testing ground for negotiated peace into a separate political and military arena.

1987–1993: HAMAS EMERGED FROM THE FIRST INTIFADA

The First Intifada was a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, beginning in 1987 and lasting until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. The uprising was initially driven by youth protests, civil disobedience, and grassroots mobilization. It evolved into organized resistance led by factions such as Hamas and the PLO. The Israeli response involved military crackdowns, curfews, and administrative detentions. Over 1,000 Palestinians and around 200 Israelis were killed. It altered international perception of the conflict and led to the recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a negotiating entity, setting the stage for the 1993 Oslo Accords.

ISRAELI OPPRESSION TRIGGERED PALESTINIAN RIOTS (INTIFADAS) 

Twenty years of Israeli military occupation after the 1967 Six-Day War left the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip under Israeli control, where Palestinians lived under martial law with restricted movement, land expropriations, home demolitions, and frequent arrests. By 1987, over 1.5 million Palestinians lived in the occupied territories. The Israeli settler population grew to 60,000 in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians suffered high unemployment, poor infrastructure, and limited access to farmland and water. Many Palestinians worked as day laborers in Israel with no job security.

The spark that ignited the Intifada was an Israeli military vehicle crashing and killing four Palestinians. Palestinians spread the rumor that the Israelis deliberately rammed the Palestinians. Israel forced the Palestine AUTHORITY (PA) to govern from exile and instead, organized itself into student unions, local charities, religious factions, and neighborhood committees.

In December, 1987, a spin-off of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood criticized the secular PA and called for armed resistance in reaction to the deadly vehicle crash. 

Unlike the PA, Hamas was Islamist rather than secular nationalist, rooted in mosques and social networks, and adamant that Palestinians must reject permanent peace with Israel.

When an existing leadership loses legitimacy, new movements arise from below — often more ideological and more absolute–and in Israeli-occupied Palestine, Hamas was that movement.  The Iran-Hamas cooperation worked because the two had Israel and the U.S. as their shared enemies.  Hamas and Iran set their sectarian differences aside to pose their common enemies.

1988–1995: THE PA CHOSE DIPLOMACY — IRAN REJECTED IT

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1993–1995: IRAN RENOUNCED THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY (PA) FORMED UNDER ARAFAT’S PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) FOR RECOGNIZING ISRAEL & RENOUNCING ARMED STRUGGLE

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, entered direct negotiations with Israel through the Oslo Accords. These agreements created the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an interim governing body to administer parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat secured leadership of the PA because he already headed the PLO, internationally recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people; he formally recognized Israel’s right to exist, and he renounced certain forms of armed struggle. The U.S. and Israel accepted him as a negotiating partner, calculating that a centralized authority could stabilize the territories. With this, Arafat returned from exile (1994) and became head of the newly formed PA, exercising limited self-rule under Israeli security oversight.

Iran rejected this entire framework. From Tehran’s perspective, Oslo legitimized Israel and entrenched U.S. regional influence, replaced armed struggle with negotiated compromise, and elevated a leadership (Arafat/PA) willing to coexist with Israel. Iran instead backed rejectionist actors, especially Hamas, viewing them as the more effective vehicle to resist and ultimately derail the Oslo process. The PA represented a cooperative structure imposed from above. Iran’s alignment with Hamas cultivated a dominator counter-system from below.

2000–2005: THE SECOND INTIFADA VIOLENTLY BROKE THE PA-ISRAELI PEACE ATTEMPT

By 2000, the Oslo framework had failed to produce a final settlement. Frustration, mistrust, and unresolved core issues (Jerusalem, borders, refugees, settlements) reached a breaking point.  Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount was the immediate trigger, but the underlying system was already unstable.  Sharon led Israel’s Likud party (the main opposition party in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset) and was a former general and defense minister under Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In early 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister, partly due to the shift in Israeli public opinion during the violence.

The Second Intifada rapidly transformed from protest into sustained conflict. This time, the Intifada expanded with suicide bombings inside Israeli cities, armed ambushes, and roadside attacks. The  Israeli military responded with intensified large-scale incursions into PA-controlled areas, targeted killings of militant leaders, and reoccupying key West Bank cities. Civilian casualties rose sharply on both sides.

The violence reshaped the political landscape. Israeli public opinion shifted toward security-first policies. Palestinian society is fractured between PA governance structures and armed factions (especially Hamas). Trust between the leaderships collapsed almost completely, and the Israelis undermined the P.A.  In Oslo, the Intifada unraveled. Joint Israeli–Palestinian coordination mechanisms broke down, movement restrictions and closures intensified, Israeli settlement expansion continued amid conflict, and negotiations became politically untenable. Oslo negotiations did not formally end—but they ceased to function as a viable pathway.

For Iran, the Intifada validated its earlier rejection of Oslo. The Intifada strengthened ties with Hamas and other armed groups, supported continued resistance rather than negotiation, and demonstrated that violence could disrupt diplomacy.

As the PA weakened, non-state militant networks gained relative power. The cooperator pathway (Oslo/PA) narrowed under pressure from unmet expectations and loss of legitimacy, but the dominator pathway (armed resistance/counterforce) expanded through visible impact and external backing. The system did not gradually fail—it flipped modes from negotiated coexistence to mutual coercion and fragmentation

In 1988, the PA recognized Israel and moved toward negotiation. The Oslo Accords (1993–1995) formalized that path. Iran opposed this shift as an attempt to stabilize a Middle East that aligned with U.S. and Israeli interests and instead aligned with those who rejected Oslo—including Hamas. The Accords did not resolve the conflict—they restructured it under unequal power dynamics, leaving room for rejectionist movements to grow.

1993–2000: IRAN BUILT RELATIONSHIPS WITH HAMAS

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Iran provided funding, training, and weapons support, Hezbollah acted as a model and intermediary, and Hamas expanded its military and political reach into Palestine and harassed Israel without triggering a direct Iran vs Israel war.

2000–2002: THE SECOND INTIFADA INTENSIFIED ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE SECOND INTIFADA & THE COLLAPSE OF TRUST OF THE OSLOW ACCORDS

https://cdn.britannica.com/71/261971-050-B70BB096/Intifada-Palestinians-throw-stones-at-Israeli-Soldiers-West-Bank-1988.jpg

2002: ISRAELIS INTERCEPTED PA’S KARINE-A ARMS SMUGGLING SHIP THAT ENDED PA-ISRAELI TRUST

Israeli forces intercepted a ship carrying weapons. Israel and the U.S. linked it to Iran and Palestinian actors (some journalists questioned whether evidence fully proved direct top-level involvement).

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https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/seizing-of-the-palestinian-weapons-ship-karine-a-4-jan-2002/en/English_SiteTransfer_IDF-Karine-A-weapons.jpg

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The Karine A carried 50 tons of weapons—including rockets, anti-tank missiles, and explosives. Israel and the United States stated that the shipment was linked to elements within the Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat. Arafat denied direct involvement. The incident convinced Israeli leadership that negotiation on the surface could coexist with militarization beneath it.

The Palestinian arena became connected to broader regional supply and support networks, and the Iranian model of pressuring Israel developed from a localized territorial dispute into a networked, multi-front pressure system. The dominators on both the Israeli and Iranian side concluded that Peace was temporary, and that power must be built continuously, seen or unseen. The voices in Israel that called for peace concluded that without trust, even legal treaty agreements could not bring peace. By 2002, with the seizure of the Karine A arms, the Oslo framework effectively collapsed—replaced by a shadow system of networks, proxies, and escalating distrust.

2004–2006: HAMAS PREVAILED IN GAZA

In 2004, Arafat died, perhaps murdered. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005 and in 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian elections; Hamas was no longer just a militant group, it became a governing force. Iran, as you can see in the picture below, increased support to Hamas.

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/12/xin_31110112230228548764.jpg

https://cdn.britannica.com/19/251019-050-B43761AF/gaza-strip-israeli-withdrawal-2005.jpg
https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/carc/files/2018/03/palestine_hamas_victory_ipe_20070115.jpg
2007: HAMAS TOOK GAZA & THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND GAZA BECAME PERMANENT
https://i.guim.co.uk/img/static/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2007/06/15/hamas5.jpg?auto=format&enable=upscale&fit=crop&height=630&overlay-align=bottom%2Cleft&overlay-base64=L2ltZy9zdGF0aWMvb3ZlcmxheXMvdGctYWdlLTIwMDcucG5n&overlay-width=100p&precrop=40%3A21%2Coffset-x50%2Coffset-y0&quality=85&s=32254860038a6f9ede7538dc5bbd0f76&width=1200
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In 2007, violent clashes between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority led to Hamas control of Gaza and the P.A.’s control (sort of) on the West Bank. The arrangement meant an end to unified Arab leadership in the Palestinian territories and to the Oslo Accords’ territorial vision. Hamas emerged from social breakdown and failed leadership legitimacy, not foreign invention. Oslo structured inequality rather than resolving it, and proxy warfare between the feuding PA and Hamas in the Gaza area. Iran had neither conquered Palestine nor created Hamas. But Iran had, despite the Oslo Accords, supported a hostile movement in areas Israel had conquered.  Iran had sustained the fight against Israel with money, training, and alignment, and helped Hamas survive long enough to become a governing power. Gaza became a forward node in Iran’s network strategy that shifted the war between the Israelis and Palestinians to a war between two networks, the Iranian network vs the Israeli-American network.

#IranTimeline #Hamas #Gaza2007 #OsloAccords #MiddleEastHistory #ProxyWar #IRGC #Hezbollah #Geopolitics #Palestine #Fatah #SecondIntifada #KarineA #AxisOfResistance #EnkiSpeaks #SashaAlexLessinPhD

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